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Insight problem solving is characterized by mental impasses, states of mind in which the problem solver does not know what to 
do next. Although many studies have investigated the neural correlates of insight problem solving, however, the question when 
mental impasses occur during insight problem solving has been rarely studied. The present study adopted high temporal reso-
lution ERPs to investigate the temporal dynamics of an impasse underlying insight problem solving. Time locked ERPs were 
recorded associated with problems with impasses (PWI) and problems without impasses (POI). The problem types were de-
termined by participants’ subjective responses. The results revealed an early frontocentral P2 was linked with the preconscious 
awareness of mental impasses and a P3a was associated with fixed attention when the impasse formed. These findings suggest 
the impasse may occur initially at a relatively early stage and metacognition plays an important role in insight problem solving. 
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Insight is a topic of growing interest in psychology [1–4]. 
Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver 
fails to see how to solve a problem and then “Aha” there is 
a sudden realization of how to solve it. The realization of 
how to solve the problem is usually preceded by a mental 
impasse [5], where the solver becomes stuck and cannot see 
how to solve the problem [6]. The impasse, a key and ele-
mentary process within insight, has been rarely investigated. 
Mental impasse mainly resulted from the failure of the 
‘repeated’ explorations and occurred at a late stage [7]. In 
that case, the impasse was defined as the state of mind in 
which the problem solver felt ‘all’ options have been ex-
plored and he could not think out what to do next [8]. 
However, increasing studies on insight using high temporal 
resolution ERPs showed that people overcame the impasse 
at an early stage, rather than at a later stage. Recently, Zhao 
et al. have found a positivity (P500–700) involving the 
breaking of mental set after onset of test stimuli [9]. Addi-
tionally, many studies also revealed insight problems or 
solutions as opposed to non-insight problems or solutions 
elicited an early ERP component (mainly from 200 to 800 
ms) involving set shifts [1,10,11]. Previous studies have 
indicated it usually lasted about some hundred or thousand 
milliseconds from the occurrence of an impasse to set shifts 
[12]. Hence, they suggested the mental impasse may occur 
at an early, even at the perceptual stage.  
Additionally, some theories on insight also implied men-
tal impasses might appear at an early stage. For example, 
the functional fixedness hypothesis claims the impasse re-
sults from the ‘spontaneous’ retrieval of familiar usage in a 
problem that need to be solved by a familiar object in an 
unfamiliar way [12–14]. Representation change theory 
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thinks people encounter impasses because their initial rep-
resentations are misleading [13] or incomplete [5]. Accord-
ing to traditional Gestalt theory, thinking begins when the 
‘perceptual’ field is in a state of imbalance or tension. A 
solution appears in conscious once the perceptual field rec-
ognizes itself into a better, more harmonious or balanced 
state [12]. In a word, these theories all suggest impasses 
may occur at an early stage. 
Existing studies using various approaches [7,12,15,16] 
have revealed the forming of mental impasses would result 
in more (attentional) fixation. When problem solvers enter 
an impasse, they do not know what to do next. So they tend 
to stare at the problem without testing particular solution 
ideas [12]. ERP studies revealed a late positive potential 
(LPP), especially the P3 could better reflect that process 
[17]. Traditionally, problem-solving, especially insight 
problem-solving has been viewed as an area of “higher cog-
nition” that is presumed to depend on conscious reasoning 
and processing. However, work in the last two decades had 
shown that it could be significantly influenced by non-       
conscious processes as well, even could be solved without 
awareness [18]. Moreover, many studies have revealed per-
ceptual features (e.g., problem familiarity, see [13,19]) 
which generally triggered unconscious processes also 
played important roles in insight problem-solving, especial-
ly in determining what time mental impasses appear. In 
daily life, individuals often assess rapidly (usually uncon-
sciously or intuitively) potential probability of a problem 
which successfully solved through its perceptual features as 
reflected by P2 (a positive ERP component peaking around 
200 ms after the onset of stimuli). This idea has been 
strengthened by some recent brain potential studies. In an 
ERP study, Paynter et al. observed subjects could estimate 
if the answer was known much faster than the answer could 
be retrieved and that process was linked with an early fontal 
P2 epoched from 180 to 280 ms post-stimuli [18,20]. Ryals 
et al. further found that the early ERP effect starting at 125 
ms was associated with word identification success versus 
failure. Also, they argued that this early ERP effect could be 
a preconscious marker of downstream word identification 
success vs. failure [21]. In that case, the mental impasse 
may, at least partially, occur at an early stage.  
As far, only a prior study performed by our research 
group has provided some empirical information for the 
aforementioned argument. The researchers adopted normal 
three-word Chinese riddles and employed ERPs to capture 
brain markers of mental impasses. Their results showed that 
cognitive process underlying the active solutions-seeking of 
riddles with impasses compared to those without impasses 
elicited a more positive potential in the time windows of 
120–210 ms (P170) and 620–800 ms (late LPP) after the 
onset of problems. The study suggests that the early P170 is 
linked with cognitive processes that people perceive intui-
tively mental impasses at the perceptual stage and the late 
LPP is associated with a conscious reappraisal and reflec-
tion of the impasse [22]. That study has already investigated 
initially the time course of mental impasses, but there are 
still many ambiguities. First, although it exhibited the intui-
tion even preconscious awareness play a critical role in in-
sight problem-solving, the characteristics of cognitive pro-
cesses reflected by the observed electrophysiological effect 
are unclear. In particular, it is unclear that whether the po-
tential cognitive process represented by the early ERP effect 
is metcognition or not. Second, previous studies did not 
provide empirical evidence or data for illustrating the exact 
relationship between mental impasse and problem difficulty. 
Finally, cognitive processes reflected by late LPP need em-
pirical analysis and further investigations. Studies on emo-
tion regulation have revealed that cognitive reappraisal usu-
ally elicits a LPP [23,24]. In this context, cognitive pro-
cesses reflected by the late LPP is not clear (i.e., is it a 
lagged P3 or a LPP linked with cognitive reappraisal?). 
Based on the aforementioned, the current study applied a 
source analysis measure to reanalyze and provided some 
new empirical information for identifying time course of 
mental impasses underlying insight-like problem solving.  
1  Materials and methods 
1.1  Subjects 
Thirteen healthy university students with normal or cor-
rected-to-normal visual acuity were tested (8 females; aged 
23–28 years; right-handed). All gave informed consent to 
participate.  
1.2  Stimuli 
Similar to previous studies [11,25], visual stimuli consisted 
of 130 three-character Chinese riddle problems and single-      
character solutions developed in two recent studies [22,26]. 
They were selected by three specialists on dimensions of 
familiarity, visual complexity, phoneme and scored by an-
other 103 subjects (21 male, aged 23.34±1.94 years) on a 
five-point scale in difficulty (“1” very easy, “5” very diffi-
cult). About half (e.g., 黄梅天-零; in English, “黄梅天” is 
“the rainy season”, “零” is “zero”; the Chinese word “零” is 
composed of “雨” (rain) and “令” (season), thus the answer 
to “黄梅天” is “零”) were somewhat difficult (the mean 
score ranges from 2.2 to 3.4) and the other half (e.g., 十五
日-胖; in English, “十五日” is “half a month”, “胖” is 
overweight; the Chinese word “胖” is composed of “月” 
(moon) and “半” (half), thus the answer to “十五日” is 
“胖” ) were fairly easy (the mean score ranges from 1.4 to 
1.7). All words were high frequency. 
1.3  Procedure 
The subjects were seated at a distance of about 70 cm from 
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a screen centered at eye level in an electrically shielded, 
sound-attenuating room. The experiment included two parts. 
In the practice, the subjects were trained with 10 riddles 
(included 2 false-matched fillers). The formal experiment, 
consisting of 110 true-matched riddles and 10 fillers, was 
divided into 3 blocks of 40 riddles each. Subjects were al-
lowed to have an enough rest between blocks. The fillers 
were used for avoiding response set and excluded from 
analysis. The stimuli were randomly presented.  
Each trial was initiated by the presentation of a black 
fixation cross in the center of a white display screen. The 
cross remained for 500 ms, followed by a white screen for 
300 ms. The riddle problem subsequently appeared on the 
screen and persisted for 7000 ms. After a 300 ms the white 
screen appeared, it was then followed by a solution pre-
sented for a maximum of 4000 ms. During the interval, the 
subjects should make judgments by pressing a key. If they 
have worked out a correct solution, they should press “1”; if 
they have not worked out a solution before the solution 
presentation, and have not formed an association between 
the problem and the solution, they should press “3”; if they 
have generated an incorrect solution or not generated any 
solution but formed an association between the solution and 
problem, they should press “2”. Accordingly, the problem 
types were determined. Problems without impasses (POI) 
were those problems for which the subjects pressed “1”; 
problems with impasses (PWI) were those problems for 
which the subjects pressed “3”. The problems for which the 
subjects pressed “2” would be excluded from analysis be-
cause it was not clear whether there were impasses or not.  
1.4  ERP recording and analysis 
EEG was continuously recorded via 64 scalp electrodes 
mounted on an elastic cap (Neuroscan) according to the 
extended 10–20 system. All recordings were referenced to 
the right mastoid. Eye blinks were recorded through left 
supraorbital and infraorbital electrodes. The horizontal elec-
troculogram (EOG) was recorded via electrodes placed 1.5 cm 
lateral to the left and right external canthi. All inter-       
electrode impedance was kept less than 5 kΩ. The EEG was 
amplified using a 0.1–30 Hz band pass and was continu-
ously sampled at 500 Hz/channel for off-line analysis. The 
EEG data were re-referenced offline to the algebraic aver-
age of the left and right mastoids. Ocular artifacts were cor-
rected with an eye-movement correction algorithm. All tri-
als in which EEG voltages exceeded ±90 V during the 
recording epoch were excluded from the analysis.  
Analysis of the ERP data was performed for 800 ms 
starting at the onset of the problems. Epochs for every sub-
ject were averaged relative to a pre-stimulus baseline that 
was made up of 100 ms of activity proceeding the epoch of 
interest. Trials with artifacts (voltage exceeded ±90 V in 
any channel) and false-matched problems were excluded 
from the average. The trials included in any individual av-
erage were more than 20. A filter was set to 30 Hz for low 
pass after the average. F3, FZ, F4, C3, CZ, C4, P3, PZ, P4, 
O1, OZ, and O2 were selected for statistical analyses. The 
scalp sites were divided into two orthogonal factors of cau-
dality (frontal, F; central, C; parietal, P; occipital, O) and 
laterality (left, L; midline, M; right, R). The average ampli-
tude was computed by a three-way repeated measures anal-
ysis of variance (ANOVA). The factors were problem type, 
caudality, and laterality. The Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was applied where appropriate.  
1.5  Source analysis 
A single equivalent dipole source model was used for each 
independent component selected. The DIPFIT function in 
EEGLAB [27], a non-linear fitting of a single dipole model, 
was used to explain the scalp potential distribution [28]. The 
source location was estimated within a four-shell, spherical 
model of the head. For the head model, the researchers as-
sumed conductivities (mhos m1) of 0.33, 0.0042, 1.00, and 
0.33 for the scalp, skull, CSF, and brain, respectively. The 
radii of the spheres were standardized to 85, 79, 72, and 71 
mm, respectively. Transposition of the dipole location from 
the spherical head model to the average MRI template was 
included in the DIPFIT function, by co-registering the 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) average brain image 
with the electrode landmark positions. Then, the anatomical 
location of the fitted source was defined using the Talairach 
Daemon client with 5 mm of cube search range (Research 
Imaging Center, University of Texas) [29].  
2  Results 
Behavioral results showed the mean trials for PWI, POI, 
and the discarded “2” problems were not different (37±11.3, 
30±11.1, and 30±10.8, respectively), F(2, 24)=1.77, P>0.05. 
To investigate the exact relationship between mental im-
passes and problem difficulty, the present study performed a 
detailed analysis. Those problems were sorted into two cat-
egories according to the predefined problem difficulty (as-
sessed by 103 participants) in the prior experiment. One is 
difficult, the other is relatively easy. Similarly, the present 
study counted the number of response of two types, i.e., 
PWI and POI. As before, problem types were determined by 
individual subjective responses. Results showed that 
69.82% of problems with mental impasses are the prede-
fined difficult problems, whereas only 30.18% are the easy 
ones. Meanwhile, only 10.84% of problems without mental 
impasses are the predefined difficult problems, about 
89.16% of them are the easy ones. The correlation analysis 
further revealed that there is a very significant (positive) 
correlation (about 0.70) between the number of individuals’ 
PWI and the number of individuals’ predefined difficult 
problems (i.e., only involved these predefined difficult and 
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easy problems responded with “1” and “3”, for details, see 
“2.3 Procedure”), P<0.001. Also, there is a highly signifi-
cant (negative) correlation (about 0.70) between the num-
ber of individuals’ POI with the number of the predefined 
difficult ones, P<0.001. However, there is also a significant 
(positive) correlation (about 0.24) between the number of 
the PWI and that of the easy, P<0.05. Additionally, there is 
a strongly (positive) correlation (0.74) between the number 
of the POI and that of the easy, P<0.001. These detailed 
results suggest that problem difficulty also plays an im-
portant role in mental impasses, it is not the sole factor de-
termines whether a problem includes a mental impasse or 
not. The grand average ERPs and topographic maps for 
each condition are shown in Figure 1. Visual inspection 
revealed that early ERP components following problems, 
were markedly elicited, including N1 (N60–120), P2 
(P120–210), N2 (N190–250), and N3 (N320–440), inde-
pendently of problem type. Latencies were not different 
(Ps>0.05). The average amplitude of N1 was measured by 
the three-way repeated measures ANOVA, only the effect 
of laterality×caudality was marked, F(6, 72)=4.08, P<0.05. 
Similarly, the ANOVAs revealed no main effect on N2 ex-
cept significant problem type×caudality and laterali-
ty×caudality interactions, as well as no difference on N3 
except the effect of caudality, F(3, 36)=3.50, P<0.05, and 
laterality×caudality, F(6, 72)=5.50, P<0.01.  
However, distinct ERP waveforms emerged for POI vs. 
PWI on the P2 (120–210 ms) and within LPP (440–800 ms) 
time range. As shown in Figure 1, P2 was a positivity oc-
curring approximately at 160 ms post-stimuli and peaking at 
Cz. The study employed 2(problem type)×4(caudality)×    
3(laterality) repeated measures ANOVA to the amplitudes 
of P2 and LPP, respectively. Results on P2 showed signifi-
cant effects of problem type, F(1, 12)=5.94, P<0.05, cau-
dality, F(3, 36)=11.75, P<0.001, and laterality, F(6, 
72)=14.01, P<0.001. Further test showed the frontocentral 
P2 exhibited significant effects of problem type, F(1, 12)= 
6.49, P<0.05, laterality, F(2, 24)=7.98, P<0.01; whereas the 
parietoccipital P2 exhibited effects of caudality, F(1, 
22)=16.50, P<0.01, laterality, F(2, 24)=8.56, P<0.01, and 
laterality×caudality, F(2, 24)=5.08, P<0.05. PWI elicited a 
greater anterior P2 but not posterior P2 than POI. Previous 
studies revealed there was a difference in some late time 
frames, the time course of LPP was thus divided into two 
consecutive time windows: early LPP (440–620 ms) and 
late LPP (620–800 ms). The analyses showed the fronto-
central sites elicited a greater early LPP than the parietoc-
cipital ones, and the late LPP showed significant effects of 
problem type, F(1, 12)=10.33, P<0.01, and caudality, F(3, 
36)=20.05, P<0.001. To exclude alternative interpretations 
on cognitive function of the late LPP (e.g., cognitive reap-
praisal of mental impasse, because the observed LPP has 
been reported to be associated with cognitive reappraisal in 
emotion regulation literature), the present study employed 
source analysis to capture the neural generators of the late 
LPP (620800 ms). The current investigation obtained the 
difference wave by subtracting the ERP waveform triggered 
by POI from the ERP waveform elicited by PWI. Inde-
pendent component analysis (ICA) revealed that the differ-
ence wave in the time course of 620800 ms has seven 
neural generators. However, only two cortical generators 
were relatively reasonable. One was located approximately 
in the left superior frontal gyrus (location according to Ta-
lairach coordinates: x=5, y=24, z=50; Figure 2) and the  
 
 
Figure 1  Grand average ERPs (N=13) (top) and topographic maps (bottom, up: POI; down: PWI) on experimental conditions. POI, problems without 
mental impasses; PWI, problems with mental impasses. 
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Figure 2  Dipole source localization (left superior frontal gyrus) for the 
difference waveform (PWI-minus-POI) of the late LPP (620–800 ms) was 
superimposed on the MR-based head model of one subject. 
second near the left cuneus (x=0, y=94, z=24). However, 
the first was relatively better than the second, because the 
residual variance (RV) of the first came close to 0.12% 
whereas the RV of the second was 32.51%.  
3  Discussion 
The mental impasse plays a necessary and critical role in a 
variety of insight problem solving and incubation, but, as 
yet, relatively little is known about its neural correlates. 
Moreover, the question when the impasse occurs during 
insight problem solving has rarely been studied. The study 
adopted ERPs to systematically investigate temporal dy-
namics of an impasse for the first time.  
The most important finding of the study is that the fron-
tocentral P2 emerged earlier in peak latency (than that of the 
classical P2 observed in previous studies), and was larger in 
amplitude for problems with impasses (PWI) than for prob-
lems without impasses (POI). The findings reveal the P2 
peaking at approximately 160 ms post-stimulus as a func-
tion of problem type; PWI elicited a larger P2 than POI. P2 
has generally been associated with perceptual processing of 
stimuli and priming effect. Here, the observed P2 amplitude 
solely exhibited a problem type effect in the frontocentral 
areas but not in the parietoccipital areas, indicating the P2 
reflected not only neuropsychological processing of percep-
tion. Although the problems in this study were divided into 
difficult and easy problems and one might believe the fron-
tocentral P2 amplitude reflected neurocognitive processing 
of problem difficulty, previous studies using various types 
of problems revealed problem difficulty was marked by the 
amplitude of N2 or N300 [30,31], even the latencies of ERP 
components [31–33]. With regard to the relationship be-
tween mental impasses and problem difficulty, the present 
study made detailed analyses. Results showed that problem 
difficulty also played an important role in mental impasses, 
it was not the sole factor determined whether a problem 
included a mental impasse or not. In other word, the current 
results implied that not only problem difficulty but also 
other factors such as individual’s knowledge and problem 
representation played important roles in determining whether 
an individual might encounter a mental impasse or not. In 
this context, the P2 did not reflect cognitive process of dif-
ficulty. Therefore, the P2 may reflect neurocognitive pro-
cess of mental impasses. 
It was worth thinking that the frontocentral P2 reflected 
the final formation of mental impasses, although some 
studies argued individuals have already initiated the genera-
tion of impasses before they see or perceive problems [22]. 
The impasses of some types of problems occur without any 
exploration of problem space, but it occurs after an initial 
exploration of problem space for most types of problems 
[12]. It is impossible for the initial exploration of the prob-
lem space (which has to occur before an impasse) to take 
place in such an immediate period following problem onset. 
Accordingly, the observed P2 probably reflected metacog-
nitive processing of impasses but not the final formation of 
the impasse itself. Traditionally, metacognition aids in the 
representation of the problem through the conscious reflec-
tion and reassessment of the problem when one encounters 
a piece of mental obstacle. Given it is impossible for the P2 
to represent the reflective or conscious thinking on the 
forming or formed impasses; the P2 thus reflects metacog-
nitive awareness of an impasse. In other words, metacogni-
tion in this study may not be responsible for off-line reflec-
tion and conscious reassessment but initial evaluation as 
well as rapid assessment without conscious. Specifically, 
the P2 may play a role by performing rapid assessment of 
whether a stimulus seems sufficiently familiar to merit a 
successful or effortful solving. Problems that pass this ini-
tial assessment may encounter potential impasses while 
those deemed too unfamiliar may not. Put another way, the 
neurocognitive process reflected by frontocentral P2 uses a 
rapid heuristic based on the stimulus-driven processing to 
assess (or differentiate) initially potential impasses so that 
guides strategy selection and attention allocation in the pre-
sent task. In according with this view, Paynter et al. found 
an early frontal P2 effect (beginning at 180 ms) was associ-
ated with an initial FOK judgment that discriminated be-
tween studied math equations that would later be solved and 
studied math equations that would not, and the P2 amplitude 
as a function of problem familiarity (collapsed across strat-
egy chosen) and whether or not the subject obtained a suc-
cessful on-time retrieval trial [19]. The frontal P2 as a pre-
conscious indicator of FOK was thought to be linked with 
the use of a rapid heuristic based on the perceptual pro-
cessing of a stimulus to guide strategy selection. Ryals et al. 
observed an early ERP effect starting at 125 ms associated 
with word identification success versus failure [21]. Niko-
laev et al. also found that a frontal P2 evoked by the ef-
fect-incompatible flankers might reflect stimulus evaluation 
and conflict detection, and thought that the P2 effect might 
be involved in performing a quick assessment of whether a 
stimulus seemed sufficiently familiar to merit an effortful 
search [34]. Previous neuroimaging studies revealed there 
was an “early warning system” involving mental impasses 
during insight problem solving [35,36]. Furthermore, the 
“early warning system” exhibited different activations when 
the subjects became familiar with the insightful solving of 
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puzzles and developed some task-general strategies [35]. In 
another ERP study [22], the researchers found that intuition 
played an important role in foreseeing the impasse. Taken 
together, the findings demonstrate the P2 in processing in-
sight problems, as a stimulus-driven frontal metacognitive 
mechanism, reflects preconscious awareness of the impasse. 
It suggests metacognition and conventional thinking of hu-
man may have so high a sensitivity and capacity of auto-
matic information processing that individuals can know 
whether there is a potential impasse underlying problem 
solving before they start thinking about problems. 
Another finding of interest was that a broadly distributed 
positivity between 620 and 800 ms was elicited by two 
types of problems, and the amplitude differences across 
conditions were mainly pronounced at central and frontal 
sites, although there was no problem type effect in the time 
window of early LPP (from 440 to 620 ms). Our experiment 
revealed the LPP might not be linked with set shifts or the 
forming of novel associations mentioned in other studies on 
insight, because the data suggested subjects had never bro-
ken mental sets or formed novel associations until the solu-
tion presentation in the PWI condition. Chen et al. found 
LPP might consist of several separate components, includ-
ing the anterior P3a and posterior P3b and the positive slow 
wave under certain conditions [32]. According to the results 
of source analysis, the neural generator of the late LPP was 
located in the left superior frontal gyrus. Previous studies 
have exhibited that the neural generator of P3a was primar-
ily located in the frontal cortex [37,38] whereas the P3b was 
mainly located near the superior parietal lobule [38,39]. 
Thus, the observed LPP (in the time window of 620–800 ms) 
is actually a P3a component. It has generally been accepted 
that P3a is a late phase of orienting response that is sensitive 
to central controlled processes [32,40]. In particular, P3a is 
associated with the controlled processing phenomena trig-
gered by previous automatic processes reflected by the 
frontocentral P2, and its generation requires top-down 
mechanism initiated by frontal lobe functions [40]. That is, 
attention marked by the P3a is selective and conscious. Here, 
the participants (selectively) focus their attentions on riddle 
problems rather than others.  
The problem solver is likely to experience an impasse 
resulting from mental set and/or exhausting the available 
options and resources, since he/she is unable to make fur-
ther progress and subsequently he/she will give up. From an 
information processing point of view, the system has 
reached a limited point at mental impasse: any new possible 
options or interpretations from long-term memory are 
blocked from further processing within working memory. 
As mentioned in the introduction, attention usually serve as 
a “general gatekeeper” for manipulating information within 
working memory by exerting top-down control over which 
information is the most relevant and may occupy the limited 
space [41]. In other words, the impasse may be caused by 
an “attentional overload” [16]. Indeed, numerous studies 
observed that mental impasses were linked with attention. 
Thomas and Lleras observed post-impasse attentional shifts 
function as an implicit aid to insight [42]. Knoblich et al. 
observed the problem solver spent more time to stare at the 
problem after they entered into an impasse [12], i.e., mental 
impasses have been linked to prolonged periods of visual 
fixation. Bilalić also found problem solvers continued to 
stare at features of the problem related to the solution they 
had already thought of [43]. In an ERP study using verbal 
remote associate problems, the investigators found selective 
attention was linked with impasses [16]. Additionally, pre-
vious studies have illustrated that P3 is a good ERP marker 
of selective attention [17]. Therefore, the late LPP may re-
flect the forming of an impasse.  
In sum, mental impasse is a necessary component for in-
sight [6,12] and that the time period of struggling with the 
problem without achieving the solution is as important as 
the sudden realization [16]. To the best of our knowledge, 
no study has assessed the time course of mental impasses. 
Using real-time ERPs, the study investigated temporal dy-
namics of impasses underlying insight-like problem solving. 
Our findings that the impasse is associated with the fronto-
central P2 and the late LPP post problems demonstrate the 
impasse occurs at a relatively early stage. Furthermore, the 
study revealed that metacognition as an “early warning sys-
tem” based on perceptual features involves guiding strategy 
selection and attention allocation. Additionally, it is note-
worthy that frontal regions and perceptual features of prob-
lems play an important role in differentiating potential im-
passes during insight problem solving. In a word, the pre-
sent study demonstrates the impasse appears initially at a 
relatively early stage of problem solving, although it can not 
rule out the possibility that mental impasses underlying 
some types of insight problem solving happen at a tradi-
tionally later stage. Studies in future seem to further inves-
tigate the accuracy of the initial or experience-based meta-
cognitive prediction on the impasse and the role of intuition 
in insight-like problem solving. 
We thank Prof. Knoblich G. and Liu Chao, whose comments and sugges-
tions prompted further analysis and formed this research. This work was 
supported by the National Basic Research Program of China 
(2010CB833904), Research Innovation Program for College Graduates of 
Jiangsu Province (CXLX12_0353, CXLX12_0351), and the Fourth 
High-level Personnel Training Project in Jiangsu Province. 
1 Dietrich A, Kanso R. A review of EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging 
studies of creativity and insight. Psychol Bull, 2010, 136: 822–848 
2 Jung-Beeman M, Bowden E M, Haberman J, et al. Neural activity when 
people solve verbal problems with insight. PLoS Bio, 2004, 2: e97 
3 Ludmer R, Dudai Y, Rubin N. Uncovering camouflage: amygdala 
activation predicts long-term memory of induced perceptual insight. 
Neuron, 2011, 69: 1002–1014 
4 Luo J, Niki K. Function of hippocampus in “insight” of problem 
solving. Hippocampus, 2003, 13: 316–323 
5 Kaplan C A, Simon H A. In search of insight. Cogn Psychol, 1990, 
22: 374–419 
6 Moss J, Kotovsky K, Cagan J. The effect of incidental hints when 
problems are suspended before, during, or after an impasse. J Exp 
Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, 2011, 37: 140–148 
290 Shen W B, et al.   Sci China Life Sci   March (2013) Vol.56 No.3 
7 Smith S M. Getting into and out of mental ruts: A theory of fixation, 
incubation, and insight. In: Sternberg R J, Davidson J E, eds. The 
Nature of Insight. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1995. 229–251 
8 Weisberg R W, Alba J W. An examination of the alleged role of 
“fixation” in the solution of several “insight” problems. J Exp 
Psychol Gen, 1986, 110: 169–192 
9 Zhao Y, Tu S, Lei M, et al. The neural basis of breaking mental set: 
an event-related potential study. Exp Brain Res, 2011, 208: 181–187 
10 Qiu J, Li H, Luo Y, et al. Brain mechanism of cognitive conflict in a 
guessing Chinese logogriph task. Neuroreport, 2006, 17: 679–682 
11 Qiu J, Li H, Yang D, et al. The neural basis of insight problem solving: 
An event-related potential study. Brain Cogn, 2008, 68: 100–106 
12 Knoblich G, Ohlsson S, Raney G. An eye movement study of insight 
problem solving. Mem Cogn, 2001, 29: 1000–1009 
13 Knoblich G, Ohlsson S, Haider H, et al. Constraint relaxation and 
chunk decomposition in insight problem solving. J Exp Psychol 
Learn Mem Cogn, 1999, 25: 1534–1555 
14 Ollinger M, Jones G, Knoblich G. Investigating the effect of mental 
set on insight problem solving. Exp Psychol, 2008, 55: 269–282 
15 Chrysikou E G, Weisberg R W. Following the wrong footsteps: 
Fixation effects of pictorial examples in a design problem-solving 
task. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn, 2005, 31: 1134–1148 
16 Sandkühler S, Bhattacharya J. Deconstructing insight: EEG correlates 
of insightful problem solving. PLoS ONE, 2008, 3: e1459 
17 Rushby J A, Barry R J, Doherty R J. Separation of the components of 
the late positive complex in an ERP dishabituation paradigm. Clin 
Neurophysiol, 2005, 116: 2363–2380 
18 Paynter C A, Kieffaber P D, Reder L M. Problem-solving without 
awareness: An ERP investigation. Neuropsychologia, 2010, 48: 
3137– 3144 
19 Reder L M, Ritter F. What determines initial feeling of knowing? 
Familiarity with question terms, not with the answer. J Exp Psychol 
Learn Mem Cogn, 1992, 18: 435–451 
20 Paynter C A, Reder L M, Kotovsky K. Knowing we know before we 
know: ERP correlates of initial feeling-of-knowing. Neuropsychologia, 
2009, 47: 796–803 
21 Ryals A J, Yadon C A, Nomi J S, et al. When word identification 
fails: ERP correlates of recognition without identification and of 
word identification failure. Neuropsychologia, 2011, 49: 3224–3237 
22 Shen W B, Liu C, Luo J, et al. Brain perceived intuitively mental 
impasses in insight problem solving: An ERP study (in Chinese). 
Acta Psychol Sin, 2012, 44: 924–935 
23 Thiruchselvam R, Blechert J, Sheppes G, et al. The temporal 
dynamics of emotion regulation: An EEG study of distraction and 
reappraisal. Biol Psychol, 2011, 87: 84–92 
24 Hajcak G, Nieuwenhuis S. Reappraisal modulates the electrocortical 
response to unpleasant pictures. Cogn Affective Behav Neurosci, 
2006, 6: 291–297 
25 Mai X Q, Luo J, Wu J H, et al. “Aha!” effects in a guessing riddle 
task: An event-related potential study. Hum Brain Mapp, 2004, 23: 
128–128 
26 Shen W B, Liu C, Zhang X J, et al. The time course and hemispheric 
effect of “insight” in three-character Chinese riddles task: An ERP 
study (in Chinese). Acta Psychol Sin, 2011, 43: 229–240 
27 Delorme A, Makeig S. EEGLAB: An open source toolbox for analysis 
of single-trial EEG dynamics. J Neurosci Meth, 2004, 134: 9–21 
28 Scherg, M. Fundamentals of dipole source potential analysis. In: 
Grandori F, Hoke M, Romani G, eds. Auditory Evoked Magnetic 
Fields and Electric Potentials. Karger: Basel, 1990. 40–69 
29 Lancaster J L, Woldorff M G, Parsons L M, et al. Automated 
Talairach atlas labels for functional brain mapping. Hum Brain Mapp, 
2000, 10: 120–131 
30 Zhou X, Chen C, Dong Q, et al. Event-related potentials of single-    
digit addition, subtraction, and multiplication. Neuropsychologia, 
2006, 44: 2500–2507 
31 Berg W K, Byrd D L, McNamara J P, et al. Deconstructing the tower: 
Parameters and predictors of problem difficulty on the Tower of 
London task. Brain Cogn, 2010, 72: 472–482 
32 Chen A, Luo Y, Wang Q, et al. Electrophysiological correlates of 
category induction: PSW amplitude as an index of identifying shared 
attributes. Biol Psychol, 2007, 76: 230–238 
33 Pauli P, Lutzenberger W, Birbaumer N, et al. Neurophysiological 
correlates of mental arithmetic. Psychophysiology, 1996, 33: 522– 
529 
34 Nikolaev A R, Ziessler M, Dimova K, et al. Anticipated action 
consequences as a nexus between action and perception: Evidence 
from event-related potentials. Biol Psychol, 2008, 78: 53–65 
35 Luo J, Niki K, Phillips S. The function of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) in the insightful solving of puzzles: the ACC is 
activated less when the structure of the puzzle is known. J Psychol 
Chin Soc, 2004, 5: 195–213 
36 Luo J, Niki K, Phillips S. Neural correlates of the ‘Aha! reaction’. 
Neuroreport, 2004, 15: 2013–2017 
37 Friedman D, Cycowicz Y M, Gaeta H. The novelty P3: An event-      
related potential (ERP) sign of the brain’s evaluation of novelty. Neu-
rosci Biobehav Rev, 2001, 25: 355–373 
38 Restuccia D, Marca G D, Marra C, et al. Attentional load of the pri-
mary task influences the frontal but not the temporal generators of 
mismatch negativity. Brain Res, 2005, 25: 891–899 
39 Halgren E, Marinkovic K, Chauvel P. Generators of the late cognitive 
potentials in auditory and visual oddball tasks. Electroenceph clin 
Neurophysiol, 1998, 106: 156–164 
40 Carretié L, Hinojosa J A, Martín-Loeches M, et al. Automatic 
attention to emotional stimuli: Neural correlates. Hum Brain Mapp, 
2004, 22: 290–299 
41 Awh E, Vogel E K, Oh S H. Interactions between attention and 
working memory. Neuroscience, 2006, 139: 201–208 
42 Thomas L, Lleras A. Covert shifts of attention function as an implicit 
aid to insight. Cognition, 2009, 111: 168–174 
43 Bilalić M, McLeod P, Gobet F. Why good thoughts block better ones: 
the mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition, 
208, 108: 652–661 
 
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
 
